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The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human
character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are
characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to
understand each other’s intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with
this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level
mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then
how do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism
who are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence
suggests? Secondly, to deﬁne cooperation as the result of two de-contextualized minds
reading each other’s intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated,
interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants’ relational and
personal history and experience. In this paper we challenge such accounts of cooperation,
calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual attitude
toward the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Taking an enactive
perspective, we argue that cooperation is an intrinsic part of any interaction, and that there
can be cooperative interaction before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The
issue then is not whether one is able or not to read the other’s intentions, but what it
takes to participate in joint action. From this basic account, it should be possible to build
up more complex forms of cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation
in these terms may enhance our understanding of human social development, and foster
our knowledge of different ways of engaging with others, as in the case of autism.
Keywords: cooperation, development, autism, infancy, social interaction, participatory sense-making
INTRODUCTION
The ability to cooperate has received increasing attention over
the past years, particularly by researchers from analytical phi-
losophy, and from developmental and comparative psychology.
Cooperation has been described as the “coordinated, synchronous
activity that is the result of a continued attempt to construct
and maintain a shared conception of a problem” (Teasley and
Roschelle, 1993) or, more basically, as consisting in “(i) act-
ing or working together and (ii) a common or the same end
or purpose” (Tuomela, 2000, p. 3). One of the reasons why
cooperation has been considered such an important topic in the
past two decades, is its apparent importance in exploring differ-
ences between humans and other animals (especially great apes;
Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2009). Moll and Tomasello
(2007, p. 1) have argued that “among primates, humans are by far
themost cooperative species, in just about anyway this appellation
is used (. . .) constituted by all kinds of cooperative institu-
tions and social practices with shared goals and differentiated
roles.”
Despite its extensive exploration by philosophers and psychol-
ogists, a clear description and understanding of what makes an
activity cooperative is still controversial. This is because cooper-
ation is often described, by mainstream accounts, as depending
on high-level social skills, and this, as Butterﬁll (2012) puts it,
“already presupposes too much sophistication in the use of psy-
chological concepts” to be applicable in the investigation of more
basic forms of cooperation. Indeed, most of the empirical studies
on children’s cooperation are based on inferential and mentalistic
theoretical accounts, which may not be the most adequate frame-
work to studyhow it emerges in typical and atypical developmental
paths.
In this paper we challenge these theoretical models and pro-
pose to widen the exploration of what cooperation is, what kind
of experiences may support someone’s cooperative participation
in joint actions, and how this participation may develop over time.
Widening the concept of cooperation, we aim to explore the dif-
ferent interactional modalities for it to work out, including those
that are not explicitly or previously agreed on as cooperation. We
end by drawing some implications of such a change in perspective
for cooperation in infancy and in autism.
PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF COOPERATION
Current theories of joint action have attempted to describe coop-
eration as a phenomenon primarily based in cognitive abilities.
These theories depict social encounters (and cooperative actions)
as encounters of minds, where participants have to infer each
other’s beliefs and desires to understand and predict the other’s
intentions and moves. Central to these theories is the concept of
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shared intentionality. Many philosophical theories propose that
joint actions require the creation of shared (or collective, or joint)
intentions1 (Gilbert, 1989; Bratman, 1992, 1993; Searle, 1995;
Tuomela,1995). Sharing intentions is possiblewhenpartnersmake
individual plans for achieving a common goal, and then formu-
late predictions upon the other’s intention to achieve the same
goal (Gilbert, 1989, 2000; Bratman, 1992; Tuomela, 1993, 2005;
Pacherie, 2006). Shared intentions, according to Bratman (1992)
are deﬁned as a set of interrelated individual intentional states.
In shared activities, he claims, “each agent intends that the group
perform the joint action in accordance with and because of mesh-
ing subplans of each participating agent’s intention that the group
so act.” (Bratman, 1992, p. 333). According to this view, a joint
activity is the result of a shared intention, and a shared inten-
tion is simply a pattern of “interlocking” plan-intentions of the
participants about which they have common knowledge. Essen-
tially, for cognitivist philosophical approaches, partners engage in
cooperative actions if they are able to infer each other’s thoughts
and plans, and combine them to build their co-actions in some
shared way.
As the interest in exploring joint intentionality and joint actions
has grown, further theorization followed the original descriptions
of cooperation. Building up on Bratman’s account, for example,
Tummolini (2013) suggests that representing one’s own goal and
those of others from a third-person observational perspective is
also a necessary cognitive ability to collaborate, along with mind-
reading. Thanks to this allocentric representation of goals (as he
names it) individuals are endowed with both “an intention in
favor of the joint action and one in favor of a joint mode of
reasoning,” which enables them to coordinate in a joint action.
Other researchers have attempted to formulate less cognitively
demanding accounts of shared intentionality, yet still consider-
ing representing intentions at the very ground of any joint action.
Sebanz et al. (2006, p. 70), for instance, proposed that a successful
joint action “depends on the abilities (i) to share representations,
(ii) to predict actions, and (iii) to integrate predicted effects of
own and others’ actions.”
Because they presuppose the presence of high-level socio-
cognitive capacities, standard accounts of cooperation hardly
apply to those who do not possess propositional knowledge
about others’ intentions, such as young children or animals,
and some philosophers have already questioned this assump-
tion. Tollefsen (2005), for instance, argued that awareness of
another’s intention may not depend on inferring it, but on
the ability to track intentions-in-action. She argues that attend-
ing to each other’s actions provides participants with a shared
perceptual space constructed through joint attention dynamics.
In this shared space, intentions-in-action are perceptually overt
and identiﬁable so that even young children without a “robust
theory of mind” (p. 81) can theoretically engage in coopera-
tive activities. Despite these developmental concerns, the author
1We will not go into the debate here about speciﬁc differences between shared
or collective intentionality or other denominations as it is not relevant for our
argument. For an overview of analytic standpoints on the terms, see (Schweikard
and Schmid, 2013).
explicitly renounces to address how this perspective can be effec-
tively applied from very early in development, by saying that
“[p]rior to the ﬁrst year, young infants are like windowless mon-
ads” (p. 80), implying that they cannot yet interact. By stressing
the importance of joint attention and social referencing mecha-
nisms (as deﬁned by Tomasello, 1995) for the building up of a
shared space, she neglects the possibility of earlier forms of coop-
eration, e.g., in infancy. Similarly concerned with understanding
the role of joint action in development, Butterﬁll (2012) pro-
posed to replace the concept of shared intentions with that of
shared goals. Sharing a goal, in his view, only requires agents’ goal-
directed actions to be coordinated, but does not imply knowledge.
This move should make cooperation possible in early develop-
ment. However, he also claims that possessing a shared goal
requires representing goal-directed actions, and the way this is
achieved by young children, in his proposal, is not completely
clear.
We ﬁnd all these arguments to reﬂect a general problem with
the cooperation research reviewed so far: cooperation is framed
in its full-blown, adult form and therefore it is difﬁcult to see
how those who do not have high socio-cognitive skills (including
representing goal-directed actions) or experience could possibly
cooperate. This is our main concern in the present paper.
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL ACCOUNTS OF COOPERATION
Deﬁning what is to cooperate from a developmental point of view
is challenging. Recent developmental research in psychology has
endorsed a cognitivist account of shared cooperative activities,
suggesting that a major step in children’s social cognitive devel-
opment occurs when, at around 12–14 months, children begin to
engage with adults in cooperative activities involving an under-
standing of interdependent roles (Tomasello et al., 2005), and are
generally motivated to help the other to accomplish her role if
needed (Moll and Tomasello, 2007). Therefore, in order to coop-
erate, it seems that “children must be able to represent, monitor,
and regulate both their own and the partner’s behavior relative to
their relation to a single, common goal” (Brownell and Carriger,
1990, p. 1165).
To empirically investigate early cooperative skills through abil-
ities such as perspective taking and understanding of the other’s
intentions and goals, most of the studies on young children have
adopted speciﬁcally designed lab tasks involving role reversal or
simultaneous coordination of movements (Brownell andCarriger,
1990; Warneken et al., 2006, 2012). In the majority of these stud-
ies, successfully performed joint tasks would set the age threshold
for attributing cooperative abilities and instrumental helping to
children.
For example, Brownell et al. (2006) observed children at 19,
23, and 27 months of age engaging in peer cooperative problem
solving tasks. In these tasks, each child had to pull simultane-
ously or sequentially one handle of a wooden box to activate a
musical toy mounted on the box. Activating the toy by coordinat-
ing each other’s timing and movements would lead to successful
performance of the task. The researchers found that 1-year-old
children coordinated their actions more by coincidence than in
a cooperative way, whereas older children appeared to be more
actively cooperating toward a shared goal. They took these results
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to conﬁrm their view that the ability to cooperate depends on
“being able to represent and to share goals and intentions with a
partner” (p. 806); an ability that, according to the study, could
only be seen over the second and third years of life. Another
example is a study inwhichWarneken andTomasello (2007) inves-
tigated instrumental helping and cooperation in 14-months-olds
children. Instrumental helping was deﬁned as providing help to
people in completing a task, e.g., pick up an out-of-reach object,
whereas cooperation was measured through a series of coopera-
tive tasks to be resolved jointly, such as retrieving an object from
a vertically movable cylinder embedded in a platform. Results
showed that at 14 months children reliably helped a partner who
could not achieve a goal, but cooperated successfully only in
tasks demanding low coordination. The authors concluded that
“Helping might be easier for children than cooperating because it
requires the understanding of what another individual intends
to do (. . .), whereas cooperation requires the ability to form
a shared goal and to mesh plans of action toward that goal”
(ibid. p. 291). In other words, helping would only require to
read another’s intention, whereas cooperation would also need
for one’s own and the other’s intentions to be co-dependent and
converge.
In sum, developmental research has attempted to deﬁne
the beginning of cooperation by setting tasks based on simi-
lar premises, thus designing practical tasks that need not only
inferring but also mobilizing well-formed intentions to be com-
pleted. These premises derive from the mainstream philosophical
accounts of cooperative actions, which propose that to be engaged
in a cooperative action requires possessing mind-reading abili-
ties, and abilities to align one’s own intentions and beliefs with
the other’s, although milder, less cognitively weighted positions
have also been proposed. In the next section we will discuss what
we believe are some pitfalls of both the existing theoretical and
methodological approaches to the study of cooperation.
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES WITH STANDARD
APPROACHES
To put shared intentionality at the very basis of shared coopera-
tive action raises the question of how humans get to know others’
intentions and goals. On the standard accounts, this is done by
use of a theory of mind or a simulation mechanism, which is
“any cognitive system . . . that predicts or explains the behavior of
another agent by postulating that unobservable inner states par-
ticular to the cognitive perspective of that agent causally modulate
that agent’s behavior” (Penn and Povinelli, 2008, p. 394). This
cognitive system is often thought to be supported by the so-called
social brain (Frith and Frith, 2003; Frith, 2007).
If intentions are hidden, are joint intentions hidden too?
Within mind-reading approaches, social understanding requires,
amongother things, being able to get access to another’s intentions,
or more in general, contents of the mind. The“problem”of under-
standing others’ minds is based on the premise that intentions are
hidden and private, that is, that others’ intentions (like thoughts,
ideas, beliefs) need to be inferred through complex representa-
tional operations (Apperly, 2011). Now, how are such intentions
shared? On standard representationalist accounts, this is often
proposed to happen through some forms of mental alignment,
for instance by simultaneous mirror system activation (Gallese,
2003; Pacherie, 2006; Sebanz et al., 2006). In this view, everyone
has her own understanding of others’ intentions to jointly perform
an action, but how these understandings become shared remains
unclear. For example, Knoblich and Sebanz (2008) have attempted
to explain how people can form intentions to act together in three
steps. First, they need to be able to derive the other person’s inten-
tions behind her object-directed actions or actions directed to her
partner. Then, actors need to be able to keep knowledge of these
intentions separate from their own intentions. Eventually, “There
needs to be an intentional structure that allows an actor to relate
his/her own intention and the other’s intention to an intention
that drives the joint activity”(Knoblich and Sebanz, 2008, p. 2025).
Although it may seem very basic, this deﬁnition is still quite cogni-
tively demanding, and does not solve the main problem of how an
“intentional structure”works. Is it individual or shared, implicitly
or explicitly created?
There seems to be a gap here in the form of an empty space in
betweenpeople: these approaches have explained shared intention-
ality from an observer’s perspective, but not from a participant’s
one. This is in line with criticisms of the standard approach to
social cognition (e.g., Gallagher, 2001; Leudar and Costall, 2009)
and with views on interpersonal alignment as primarily based
on embodied engagement (Macmurray, 1991; Braten, 2003; De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009; Reddy
and Morris, 2009). Shotter (1983, p. 39) nicely summarized these
alternative positions: “Motives, intentions, sentiments are (. . .)
directly perceived by those directly involved in [a joint action] as
ﬁrst person actors and second person recipients in that activity.
Only third person observers have to make inferences.”
Another consideration is whether we need to know that we are
cooperating in order to be able to cooperate. Often, cooperation
is presupposed as something we set out to do, so that actions are
either clearly cooperative or not – a separate and identiﬁcable type
of action altogether. This may indeed sometimes be the case, for
example when two people meet to perform a certain shared task,
like bathing a very agitated dog. But taking this idea as the starting
point for understanding cooperation presupposes that we already
knowwhat it is, and sowe donot need to deﬁne the elements out of
which it could arise. It precludes, for example, the possibility that
cooperation arises without there being a predeﬁned intention or
motive to cooperate, while this may be key to understanding how
people get to cooperate in the ﬁrst place. Shared goals may emerge
during the course of an interaction, and so participants can “roll
into” cooperation without having previous awareness of it. For
instance, making space for someone who enters a crowded bus is
achieved by the new and old passengers together, each adjusting
movements and postures. Here, a common goal emerges out of
the interaction and in the context of a small space to be shared as
smoothly as possible. Understanding this emergent kind of phe-
nomenon will give us further insights into what cooperation is and
how it works.
Where is development?
We may question to what extent we can explain the role of
cooperative actions in children’s development if we conceive of
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cooperation as heavily relying on high cognitive skills, and a long
experience with social interactions. As Butterﬁll (2012, p. 24)
wrote:
If the leading account were the whole truth about joint action,
engaging in joint action would presuppose, and therefore not
explain,much of the development of reasoning about others’men-
tal states. (. . .) We need a further account of joint action, one that
is compatible with the premise that joint action plays a role in
explaining how humans develop abilities to think about minds.
Furthermore, developmental research on cooperation is based
on a rather restricted pool of tasks, which are designed to assess
cooperative problem solving and related abilities like role reversal,
perspective-taking and joint attention. These do not necessarily
cover the whole range of possible cooperative interactions in a
child’s life, as there are many situations (some of which we discuss
below) in which a clear, explicit division of roles and statement
of goals is not needed. Furthermore, the structure of these tasks
implies a“pass or fail”evaluation and seems thereforemore appro-
priate to detect when cooperative skills are already present, rather
than telling us how they emerge or develop in time (Thelen and
Smith, 1994).
Which view on cooperation one adopts is likely to have rather
serious consequenceswhen studying cooperative exchanges in typ-
ical and atypical development. This is, for example, the case with
research on cooperation in autism. Studies on cooperation in
autism that are based on mind-reading and perspective-taking
abilities2 ﬁnd that children with autism are less successful than
children with developmental delay (Sally and Hill, 2006; Liebal
et al., 2007). However, this does not mean that they are com-
pletely incapable. For instance they seem able to help an adult
as needed (Liebal et al., 2007), particularly when they under-
stand the other person’s goals toward an object (Aldridge et al.,
2000; Carpenter et al., 2001). Liebal et al. (2007) explained these
ﬁndings in terms of a speciﬁc impaired understanding of the
partner’s role within the cooperative task that would not apply
when the situation does not require knowledge of and agree-
ment on each partner’s role. Thus, it may be that children with
autism can succeed in cooperative tasks, if they do not entail an
explicit understanding and prior agreement on each partner’s role.
Similarly, if they are given appropriate interactive support, e.g.,
if they are helped with being aware of the other person in the
interaction, they can cooperate in a dual-control technology task
(Holt and Yuill, 2014).
In conclusion, to study cooperation as it develops and in condi-
tions implying impairments in social skills we need to investigate
it at a more basic level than has been done so far. In the next
section, we put forward our proposal, which looks at cooperative
interactions from the point of view of what is at stake for the indi-
viduals participating in them, and the organization of cooperative
interaction processes. For doing this, we will use the concepts
2Mainstream accounts of autism have long proposed that people with autism have
difﬁculties in mind-reading (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Dinishak and Akhtar, 2013),
joint attention (Loveland and Landry, 1986), or impairments in turn-taking skills
(McEvoy et al., 1993), although these ﬁndings are not uncontroversial, and even
primary proponents recognize that there is always a number of participants who do
pass the tests (Happé, 1994; but see also Boucher, 1989, 1996, 2012; Gernsbacher
et al., 2008).
and research tools of enaction, a speciﬁc approach to cognition
within the embodiment movement in cognitive science (Varela
et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2010).
THE ENACTIVE PERSPECTIVE ON SENSE-MAKING AND
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
Enaction is a non-reductive naturalistic approach that proposes
a deep continuity between living and cognitive processes. It
is a scientiﬁc program that explores several phases along this
life-mind continuum, based on six mutually supporting, opera-
tional concepts: autonomy, sense-making, embodiment, emergence,
experience, and participatory sense-making (Varela et al., 1991;
Thompson, 2005, 2007; De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Di Paolo
et al., 2010). Here, we ﬁrst introduce two of its main concepts:
sense-making—the enactive notion of cognition in general; and
participatory sense-making—enactive social cognition. In section
3, we start applying these ideas to understanding cooperation.
SENSE-MAKING
For enaction, “the mind is seen not as inhering in the individ-
ual, but as emerging, existing dynamically in the relationship
between organisms and their surroundings (including other
agents)” (McGann et al., 2013). Or, as Merleau-Ponty (1962, p.
430) already put it:
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject
which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is
inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject
itself projects.
In this view, the paradigmatic cases of cognizers are living
organisms (Varela, 1997; Thompson, 2007). One of their crucial
properties is their constitutive and interactive autonomy, which is
deﬁned as a network of dynamical processes (metabolic, immune,
neural, sensorimotor, etc.) that actively generates and sustains
an identity under precarious conditions (Di Paolo, 2005). An
autonomous system constantly produces itself physically, and
regulates its interactions with the world to satisfy the needs cre-
ated by its precarious condition (Di Paolo, 2005). The living
organism spontaneously generates its own goals and responds to
the environment (McGann, 2007), in accordance with its self-
organization. The cognizer is therefore always situated in a world
that is signiﬁcant for it, based on this perspective based on need.
Its world is not pre-given but largely enacted, i.e., shaped as
part of its autonomous activity. For the enactive approach, cog-
nition is embodied, meaning that a cognizer’s activity depends
non-trivially on the body. The body is more than just anatom-
ical or physiological structures and sensorimotor strategies; it is
the precarious combination of various interrelated self-sustaining
identities (organic, cognitive, social), each interacting with the
world in terms of the consequences for its own viability (Di Paolo,
2005).
These ideas together ground the enactive characterization
of cognition as sense-making : a cognizer’s adaptive regulation
of its states and interactions with the world, with respect to
the implications for the continuation of its own autonomous
identity. The concept of sense-making describes the relation
between an autonomous agent and the world of signiﬁcance it
enacts. It therefore does not conceive of cognitive processes as
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representational and avoids the known problems of cognitivism.
Organisms do not passively receive information from their envi-
ronments, which they then translate into internal representations
whose signiﬁcant value is to be added later. Natural cognitive sys-
tems participate in sense-making as a relational and affect-laden
process grounded in biological organization (Jonas, 1966; Varela,
1991, 1997; Weber and Varela, 2002; Di Paolo, 2005; Thomp-
son, 2007). Sense-making, thus, is valued or concerned acting
and interacting, leaving no gap between affect and cognition—
they are one in the relation of signiﬁcance between cognizer and
world.
PARTICIPATORY SENSE-MAKING
Having brieﬂy explained what enactive cognition is, and sense-
makers’ inherently meaningful perspective on and interactions
with the world, let us now take a closer look at social encounters,
the second main element in our enactive sketch of cooperation.
The enactive approach considers sociality in its broadest form,
namely as intersubjectivity, or themeaningful engagement between
subjects (Reddy, 2008), in which three aspects are crucial: engage-
ment, meaning, and subject. Meaning and subjectivity have been
explained above in termsof sense-making, namely as theway living
(cognizing) systems always meaningfully engage with their envi-
ronment, because they are self-organizing and self-maintaining.
In this section, we turn our gaze on engagement between such
concerned subjects.
Crucial to the enactive approach is the focus on social interac-
tion processes, which are complex phenomena involving different
dimensions of verbal and non-verbal behavior, varying con-
texts, numbers of participants and technological mediation. They
impose strict timing demands, involve reciprocal activity, exhibit a
mixture of discrete and continuous events at different timescales,
and areoften robust against external disruptions. Essential to inter-
action is that it involves engagement between agents. Engagement
(Reddy, 2008; Reddy and Morris, 2009) captures the qualitative
aspect of social interactions once they start to “take over” and
acquire a momentum of their own. It also reﬂects the way this
experience is described in everyday language (e.g., “being in sync
with someone”). Experientially, engagement is the ﬂuctuating feel-
ings of connectedness with one another, including that of being in
the ﬂow of an interaction.
In order to capture this taking-over aspect of engagement, enac-
tion deﬁnes social interaction in terms of the autonomy (as deﬁned
above) of the interaction process and that of the individuals
involved, as:
a co-regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents,
where: (i) the co-regulation and the couplingmutually affect eachother,
constituting an autonomous self-sustaining organization in the domain
of relational dynamics and (ii) the autonomy of the agents involved is
not destroyed (although its scope can be augmented or reduced; De
Jaegher et al., 2010, pp. 442–443; also De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p.
493).
Apart from each agent involved in such a coupling contributing
to its co-regulation, the interactionprocess itself also self-organizes
and self-maintains. To illustrate this, think of how sometimes,
when you encounter someone coming from the other direction in
a narrow corridor, you end up in front of each other, then each step
aside, moving to the same side at the same time, preventing both
of you from continuing on your way. This simple example shows
how the interaction process can become autonomous or “take on
a life of its own.” At the same time, the interactors also maintain
their autonomy as participants. This is a necessary condition for
calling an interaction social, because if one of the participants loses
their autonomy, for the other it would be like interacting with an
object or a tool, and thus not a social interaction anymore (De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).
Social interactions are sustained by processes of embodied
coordination, including its breakdowns and repairs (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012). Coordination
does not necessarily require cognitively complicated skill. Analyses
of social interactions and conversations in social science show that
participants can unconsciously coordinate their movements and
utterances, and this is already the case in mother-infant interac-
tions (Condon and Sander, 1974; Stern, 1977/2002; Condon, 1979;
Scollon,1981; Davis, 1982; Tronick andCohn,1989; Kendon,1990;
Grammer et al., 1998; Malloch, 2000; Jaffe et al., 2001; Issartel et al.,
2007; Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009). With the concept of coor-
dination and other dynamical systems tools, interaction dynamics
can be measured (see e.g., Kelso, 2009). Moreover, they can be
related to neural activity (see e.g., Lindenberger et al., 2009; Dumas
et al., 2010, 2012; Cui et al., 2012; Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012;
Konvalinka and Roepstorff, 2012; Schilbach et al., 2013).
Based on this deﬁnition of social interaction, and the notions
of sense-making and coordination, we can now characterize
social understanding as participatory sense-making : If, as indi-
cated above, we make sense of the world by moving around
in and with it, and we coordinate our movements with others
when interacting with them, this means that we can coordi-
nate our sense-making activities. That is, we literally participate
in each other’s sense-making activities. Thus, on the enactive
account, social understanding is understood as the genera-
tion and transformation of meaning together in interaction
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher, 2009; Fuchs and
De Jaegher, 2009). Participants co-create the interactive situ-
ation, but also the interaction process as such inﬂuences the
sense-making that takes place. If a social interaction is as char-
acterized, then people can act together, also for no apparent
end or purpose of their own, or even against their individual
ends (e.g., the corridor encounter). Even without a shared inten-
tion to start with or when entered into against their will by
the participants, interacting can change or affect one’s ends or
purposes.
This has an interesting consequence for understanding inten-
tions, namely they are truly generated and transformed interac-
tionally, and interacting with each other opens up new domains
of sense-making that we would not have on our own. This
contrasts with the way intentions are conceived in cognitivist
approaches to cooperation, as introduced above, namely as hid-
den, and only shareable by high-level cognitive mechanisms. On
our account, intentions do not ﬁrst arise or are ﬁrst made indi-
vidually, but they emerge as the interaction goes on (Di Paolo,
under review). Therefore, intentions are visible and understand-
able by each participant, also in cooperative interactions, as they
are contextualized and stem from that speciﬁc ongoing interaction.
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This makes understanding and aligning with the other’s inten-
tions un-mysterious: it happens in doing things together, which is
moving together, since movements are already and always imbued
with meaning for sense-makers (Johnson, 2007; Sheets-Johnstone,
2011;Merritt,2013). On thebasis of this,we can seehow intentions
can evolve in their jointness, meanings and speciﬁcity for those
involved throughout interaction, including cooperative ones.
COOPERATION AS A PROCESS
Here, we start from the most rudimentary or minimal form of
cooperation, in order to make it understandable from a develop-
mental point of view. With the enactive concepts of sense-making
and participatory sense-making in hand, let us now look again
at cooperation, starting from its basic deﬁnition as “(i) acting or
working together and (ii) a common or the same end or pur-
pose” (Tuomela, 2000, p. 3). Now, considering social interactions
as already cooperative in a basic sense (in line with our enactive
approach), we want to characterize our approach to cooperation
starting from this deﬁnition by Hubley and Trevarthen (1979,
p. 58):
cooperation means that each of the subjects is taking account of the
other’s interests and objectives in some relation to the extrapersonal
context, and is acting to complement the other’s response.”
In our view, “taking account of the other’s interests and objec-
tives” does not need inferencing, as we argued, but happens
through embodied interactions that are meaningful in the given
situation and in the interactional history. These actions are com-
plementary in that they ﬁt each other in some form. This is not
only the case for positive co-operations but also for situations in
which we argue and disagree about something, where some com-
plementarity is still needed in order for the disagreement even to
be played out. This means that there are different forms, layers,
and aspects of cooperation: embodied, in time, in space, in topic,
imitative or complementary, etc. The fact that we are interacting
guarantees that some basic cooperative layer is present (e.g., in the
corridor situation, we cooperate to stop cooperating) and there-
fore, every time we interact, we cooperate, in a basic sense. Also,
since sense-making always involves affect, this view of cooperation
becomes less intellectualistic and begins to investigate how affec-
tive processes may be involved in cooperation. Then, the challenge
is to investigate what further levels of cooperation are present in a
speciﬁc interaction or situation, over and above the basic interac-
tion process. This can involve different, increasinglymore complex
levels of sense-making.
Like the enactive approach, interactionist approaches such
as ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have also based
their empirical program on a theory of social interaction as
a dynamical constructions and a view of others’ intentions as
mutually accessible and accountable for. Ethnomethodology was
originally developed by Garﬁnkel to “discover the methods that
persons use in their everyday life (. . .) in constructing social
reality” (Psathas, 1968, p. 509), and thus study how this real-
ity is constructed, produced and organized in social encounters.
Derived from phenomenology, it shares with it an interest in
exploring the participants’ embodied experience of being engaged
in mundane interactions; the latter are seen as phenomena in
their own right, yet situated in speciﬁc cultural contexts and
practices (see, for instance, the work of Schütz, 1967/1932).
Inspired by ethnomethodology and by Goffman’s (1983) work
on the interaction order, Conversation analysis (Sacks et al., 1974;
Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 2007) investigates the systematic fea-
tures of naturally occurring conversations. In a large body of
work now spanning over ﬁve decades, it has revealed the ﬁne,
moment-by-moment coordination of speakers, and the sequential
structuring that enable the orderly participation of different inter-
actors across turns-at-talk and within complex activities. Central
in this approach is a view of human communication as multi-
modal, where different but integrated communicative resources
(verbal and non-verbal) contribute to establishing the interac-
tional context, anticipating, co-constructing, and if necessary
repairing the emergent deﬁnition of what is going on (Kendon,
1990; Streeck et al., 2011; Tulbert and Goodwin, 2011). Thus,
interactions are always cooperative, inasmuch as participants ori-
ent to, monitor and support the interlocutors’ understanding
and act so as to enable their successive moves (Goodwin, 1995,
2013).
Intentions and goals are not searched before or behind the
communicative action as its “cause,” but manifest in speak-
ers’ behavior, shaped and adjusted as the interaction unfolds.
Within this framework, and in convergence with enactivism,
cooperating is possible even for those – like young children –
who do not possess a robust capacity to “read” others’ inten-
tions or plans, but can nevertheless participate in joint, situ-
ated interactions (Forrester, 2008; Lerner et al., 2011; Mehus,
2011).
COOPERATION IN INFANCY
We can now ask what this view implies for understanding coop-
eration in infancy. Since infants cannot remain alive alone, they
need others to help them with nourishing, shelter, hygiene, and
social interaction. On our account, it is to be expected that infants
contribute actively to this caring, because they are themselves
sense-makers, generating and maintaining their own living iden-
tity, and also, quite possibly, already their social identity (Stern,
1985/2000; Delaﬁeld-Butt and Gangopadhyay, 2013).
Hubley (1983) deﬁned cooperation in infancy as the joint man-
agement of objects, actions or ideas to fulﬁll a purpose that two
interactors share. She identiﬁed some minimum requirements for
cooperative actions in infancy,which are (1) a sharedplanof action
within mutual orientation, with the infant attending to and act-
ing with reference to the partner’s indicated purposes; (2) active
contributions to a single coordinated event, which, on the infant’s
part, is seen as a clearly identiﬁable and oriented action to inﬂu-
ence the behavior of the partner and then mesh with the partner’s
action to complete a shared purpose; (3) willing participation. On
the one hand, such a deﬁnition seems ﬁtting with the infant’s lim-
ited communicative resources as it does not imply that the partners
should verbally agree on a shared plan or goal. However, it presup-
poses that some shared plan has been somehow established, and
requires that each partner understands the interest or purposes
of the other regarding the shared action. As we already argued,
such an explicit agreement may not be required in all forms of
cooperative interactions.
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The fundamental contribution of past developmental research
has been to reveal how early communicative interactions are cre-
ated out of contributions of both the infant and the caregiver
(Hubley and Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen, 1979). Bruner (1977)
recognized shared reference and role-taking as cooperative fea-
tures in communicative interactions involving giving and receiving
objects before 1 year of age. More recent observations have demon-
strated how, since very early in life, infants adjust and facilitate
actions directed to them, especially in daily routines such as when
the caregivers pick them up, change their nappy, or play a social
game with them (Service, 1984; Nomikou and Rohlﬁng, 2011;
Reddy et al., 2013; Ra¸czaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013; Fantasia et al.,
2014). Under a perspective that considers social interactions as
basic forms of cooperation by participating in shared, meaning-
ful interactions, infants practice their ability to make sense of
and coordinate with the caregiver’s action, becoming increasingly
skilled in their social participation.
One of the criticisms we made of existing studies was that
they measured children’s cooperative ability when they success-
fully performed a joint pre-ﬁxed task; regarding cooperation as
a cognitive skill that can be switched on and off means neglect-
ing the importance of learning processes that sprout from and
within cooperative interactions. In contrast, in a here and now
perspective the process of cooperating enables children to build
up their actions moment by moment through a sequence of rela-
tional adjustments and (dis-)engagements toward a joint goal.
Thanks to its structuring and structured nature, cooperation
may be seen as a framework in which development occurs and
at the same time as a mode of being with others learnt dur-
ing development. If we take seriously what was proposed so
far – that any interaction requires some basic cooperation, fol-
lowed, in some cases, by a process of co-negotiation toward a
more or less explicit goal that matters to those who are involved
in that process – then we may also explain how it develops.
And, at the same time, we may be able to see how participat-
ing in goal-directed joint actions supports and shapes infants’
development.
COOPERATION IN AUTISM
A different theoretical perspective may also open up new possibil-
ities for investigating cooperation in autism. As reported above,
empirical ﬁndings suggest that some children with autism (at
different chronological ages) perform poorly in high-level cooper-
ative tasks and in other correlated abilities, such as joint attention,
imitation, perspective taking, and role-reversal (see Colombi et al.,
2009). Yet, performing “poorly” does not mean that the capacity is
absent, and indeed some childrenwith autistic spectrumcondition
(ASC) do pass the cooperative tasks. This result is not consistent
with the theoretical premises informing the design of the tests and
the difﬁculties of childrenwith autism, classically understood. One
way to explain this (controversial) evidence may lie in changing
the premises we start from, instead of post hoc adjustments to the
interpretation.
Studies of the verbal production of childrenwith autism that do
not start from a deﬁcit but try to understand the children’s sponta-
neous interactional behavior, canhelp to illustrate and support this
shift of perspective. Conversation analysis studies, for example,
allow to observe how even echolalic productions (the repetition
of utterances with no apparent relation to prior talk from other
speakers), often seen in children with autism, are in fact responsive
moves (Loca and Wootton, 1995; Wootton, 1999; Stribling et al.,
2005/2006; Sterponi and Shankey, 2014). The repetition of avail-
able utterances helps children to stay in the conversation despite
their difﬁcultywith improvising anewly designed turn. Sometimes
these stereotypical contributions can take the form of questions
and feed the progression of an interaction, supporting the child’s
continued participation in a social exchange (Sterponi and Fasulo,
2010).
Dickerson et al. (2007) also show that observing what children
actually do reveals capacities for cooperation that cannot emerge
in pre-deﬁned tasks, for sometimes the ways in which children
ﬁnd solutions for their difﬁculties are not incorporated into the
tasks. They investigated classroom interactions between two autis-
tic children and their tutors. The children were asked to answer
questions, using answer-cards. During the session, each of the
children tapped the answer-cards, an action which at ﬁrst sight
seemed meaningless. However, using conversation analysis, Dick-
erson et al. (2007) could show that the children tapped on the cards
just before they started answering, and sometimes continuing into
their answering. This seems to indicate that the tapping is a way
of engaging and of “projecting a relevant forthcoming response
on the part of the child” (Dickerson et al., 2007, p. 297). In other
words, the children found means to signal their ongoing engage-
ment when the timing of their verbal production was delayed, thus
cooperating to the maintenance of the interactive plane.
Using ﬁne-grained observational methods, the actions of all
participants can be studied and analyzed in interaction, mak-
ing it possible to pick up the forms of cooperation that infants
and people with autism are capable of (see also Stribling et al.,
2009). These examples demonstrate how the use of non-verbal
and non-vocal resources for building up a co-participatory model
of how the child and teachers work together becomes possible
thanks to transcripts of the interactions. In this way, not only
the participants’ talk, but also a number of non-verbal activi-
ties that are salient for the interaction are acknowledged. These
results ﬁt well with the Vygotskian idea that collaborative work
leads to learning (Vygotsky, 1978; see also Goodwin, 2013). Fur-
thermore, these studies suggest that ways to observe cooperative
interactions in autism exist, if only we consider interactions and
autism from a different perspective. During everyday interac-
tions at home or school, in the car or at the park, children with
autism are involved in many simpler, not-always-explicit cooper-
ative exchanges. Not only are the children part of these exchanges,
but they also grow into them; namely, they learn to be active part-
ners out of everyday cooperative interaction, just like every other
child does. This is not to say that there are no difﬁculties or differ-
ences, but social understanding in autism may be more fruitfully
studied from thebasic and positive perspective we put forward
here.
IMPLICATIONS
In summary, the perspective shift we propose has implications
for understanding development as well as autism. Firstly, our
approach supports a developmental stance on cooperation in that
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it explores how we become cooperative interaction partners in the
ﬁrst place. If we assume high-order mental skills (or a great deal of
“social experience”) to be prerequisite for cooperating, we would
not able to see how infants can grow into social interactions and
gradually learn to engage with the social world around them, but
rather wait until much of the development has already happened.
If, on the other hand, we propose that cooperation is a form of
interacting and understanding each other, it does become possible
to investigate how cooperation can emerge and be learnt even in
early interactions. In this perspective, cooperation in infancy is a
product of development, as well as a process inwhich development
occurs.
An interesting aspect to consider regarding development is how
to conceive of cooperation in asymmetrical interactions. Infants
seem to be able to cooperatively coordinate with caregivers since
very early (see e.g., Reddy et al., 2013; Fantasia et al., 2014), but
they may not do it with peers until later on, as suggested by
some research (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006, 2007). From an
enactive point of view, it is not surprising that infants are bet-
ter able to cooperate with a caregiver than with a peer, since the
presence of someone with more interactive experience makes the
overall interaction more competent. This is related to Vygotsky’s
(1978) notion of the zone of proximal development, where it is
possible to scaffold someone in interaction to be jointly more
capable of activities they cannot yet do alone. What is needed
for an interaction to be cooperative if the relation is asymmet-
ric? If we think of a pick up situation, we know that the adult
is doing the major part by actually holding the infant and lifting
her up. Yet, infants are not passively waiting for it to happen.
They make speciﬁc preparatory body adjustments that facili-
tate the mother’s movements, and thus, the pick up sequence
(Service, 1984; Reddy et al., 2013). At the same time, when the
adult fails to complete the expected pick up sequence, infants
seem to stop being cooperative by dropping their body tension
and participation (Fantasia et al., 2014). In this case, although
the mother has the main role in making the pick up sequence
effective, the infant’s role is essential in its being clearly ori-
ented toward the joint achievement of the interaction. Obviously,
asymmetry may or may not play a strong role depending on the
task.
As a second point, if we are to understand autism in general,
and speciﬁcally people with autism’s capacity to cooperate (which
is ﬁrstly a particular form of social interaction) the change of
perspective we propose here may also be helpful. We may try to
forsake a typical-development perspective and, as Petra Björne
and other authors have already suggested, reverse our glasses, pay-
ing more attention to what people with ASC can do and the way
they describe their own experiences (Björne, 2007; Robledo et al.,
2012; De Jaegher, 2013; Donnellan et al., 2013). As shown by the
studies on autism presented in the previous section, if we consider
actions in their interactional context and in their signiﬁcance for
all participants, it becomes possible to understand the emergence
of cooperation also in the interactions of and with people with
autism. Exploring cooperation in children with autism from an
observer or third-person perspective not only fails to take into
account the child’s experience of cooperating as an engaged part-
ner; it also cuts out how the other person is feeling or experiencing
the child as a partner. In cases like autism, in which social inter-
actions run a different course, in which jointly attending to an
object may not be at the core of the interaction, approaching
cooperation from a second person perspective can make all the
difference.
We thus suggest that future studies on cooperation and autism
should include more ecological observations and parental reports.
We expect to gainmore detailed knowledge aboutwhat infants and
children with autism can do cooperatively in early goal-directed
interactions from taking an enactive approach. This involves:
ﬁnely studying the interaction (e.g., through ethnomethodology
or conversation analysis), taking into account the context or the
environment (using, for instance, parental reports or ecological
observations), and studying what is at stake for the individu-
als involved (i.e., asking how they make sense in and of the
interaction).
CONCLUSION
We hope to have shown that it is possible to encompass a wider
range of cooperative interactions, not only those in which inter-
actors explicitly agree upon and set rules and roles for a speciﬁc
shared task to be performed. This is not to neglect that in some
particular scenarios participants do need to make efforts to make
sense of the other’s intentions, and indeed goals need to be set out
and agreed beforehand. Only, this is not always the case, as coop-
eration is a multi-layered process that may take different forms.
In this perspective, we share Tollefsen’s view that intentions-in-
action can emerge out of ongoing interaction (Tollefsen and Dale,
2012), with the minimum requirement that interactors share an
interactional space. Cooperation is a form of participating in each
other’s sense-making, in which we may form a goal or purpose
together while interacting. It is not a skill that can be lacked but
rather a way of being with others that is possible to learn. Learning
to cooperate then becomes understandable as an important aspect
of typical and atypical development. For this reason, we think that
future developmental research on cooperation (and social cogni-
tion in general) could beneﬁt from more ecological observational
methods and less adult-centric approaches (Donaldson, 1978). As
the adult’s way of cooperating is an already fully blossomed one,
one in which the picture is complete (and intentions can be eas-
ily inferred if needed), we need instead to observe infants and
their daily living and discover the basic, emerging ways in which
cooperation develops.
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